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Abstract: 
The rise of Learning Analytics, the application of complex metrics developed to exploit the 
proliferation of ‘Big Data’ in educational work, raises important moral questions about the 
nature of what is measurable in education. Teachers, schools and nations are increasingly 
held to account based on metrics, exacerbating the tendency for fine-grained measurement of 
learning experiences. In this article, the origins of Learning Analytics’ ontology are 
explored, drawing upon core ideas in the philosophy of computing, such as the general 
definition of information and the information-theoretic account of knowledge. 
Drawing upon a reading of Descartes Meditatio II, which extends the phenomenology of 
Jean-Luc Marion into a pedagogy of intentionality, the article identifies a fundamental 
incompatibility between the subjective experience of learning and the information-theoretic 
account of knowledge. Human subjects experience and value their own information 
incommensurably with the ways in which computers measure and quantify information. The 
consequences of this finding for the design of online learning environments, and the 
necessary limitations of Learning Analytics and measurement are explored. 
Keywords: learning analytics, René Descartes, Jean-Luc Marion, philosophy of 
information 
Introduction 
The impact of learning analytics on contemporary education is pervasive, and has largely 
advanced without investigation of its informational ontology. Learning analytics denotes ‘the 
measurement, collection, analysis and reporting of data about learners and their contexts, for 
purposes of understanding and optimizing learning and the environment in which it occurs’ 
(Siemens, et al., 2011), but such a definition begs the question of what constitutes optimal 
learning. The range of datasets used by learning analytics software to measure and optimise 
student learning includes highlighted text (SparTagUs), comprehension questions (Zementis-
ADAPA) and visual models (Cognos), while approaches still in development measure at an 
even more minute level, using keystroke patterns and eye tracking to develop an increasingly 
granular model of the learning subject. Technologies currently under development effect a 
neurological reduction, promising real-time brain scanning in the classroom. The availability 
of these fine-grained measures, and their increasing importance has heralded fundamental 
shifts in the meaning of learning (Lundie, 2014a) which remain largely unexamined. Given 
the unforeseen impact which systems of assessment can have on learning (Nichol, 2012), and 
the bias which unreflective information systems design can introduce into their use (Friedman 
& Nissenbaum, 1996), an exploration of the epistemic assumptions underpinning learning 
analytics is both timely and pertinent. 
The growth of learning analytics parallels that of the rise of ‘Big Data’, the proliferation of 
fine-grained metrics about all aspects of human life, gathered by an increasingly networked 
ambient environment. By some measures, more data is generated every 2 days than in the 
whole of human history up until 2003 (Siegler, 2010). Growing concerns over the growth and 
sharing of such multifaceted metrics, including the corporate acquisition of government data 
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and government appropriation of corporate data by government have led to calls for a digital 
charter to protect openness and individual freedom online (Lundie, 2014b). 
For liberal conceptions of education, this granularity of measurement and control raises 
fundamental questions. As legal scholar Julie Cohen observes: 
Autonomous individuals do not spring full-blown from the womb. We must 
learn to process information and to draw our own conclusions about the world 
around us… ‘Autonomy’ constitutes an essential independence of critical 
faculty and an imperviousness to influence. But to the extent that information 
shapes behavior, autonomy is radically contingent upon environment and 
circumstance. The only tenable solution – if autonomy is not to degenerate 
into the simple stimulus-response behavior sought by direct marketers – is to 
underdetermine environment (Cohen, 2000, p. 1400). 
Besides the substantial moral questions raised by the prospect of increasing invasion into the 
learner’s private thoughts (Van den Hoven, 1997; Wolpe, Foster, & Langleben, 2005), many 
learning analytics applications rely on an attenuated conception of learning, which has the 
potential to elide the most fundamentally human elements of education, at precisely the 
moment when human distinctiveness is most profoundly threatened by ‘intelligent’ systems 
of control control (Floridi, 2005; Spencer, 1996). This article explores the epistemic 
foundations of information theory, central to the design of many ‘intelligent’ systems in the 
world of Big Data which includes learning analytics, and contrasts this with a 
phenomenology of human learning foundational to the European Enlightenment tradition 
from Descartes onwards, to illustrate a fundamental incompatibility.  
In an insightful sociological analysis of the impact of digital analytics on education, Selwyn 
(2014) identifies six areas for further study in the ethical consideration of learning analytics: 
1) What data exist in educational contexts? – including concern for the inter-
operability and compatibility of data. 
2) What are the ‘primary’ uses of these data? – in the case of learning analytics, 
the stated uses relate to optimisation, evaluative and formative assessment 
3) What, if any, are the ‘secondary’ uses of these data? – relating to concerns of 
contextual integrity – data being shared and re-used in unintended contexts 
(Solove, 1997) 
4) What are the consequences of these uses of data? – relating to questions of 
informational injustice – accumulation of data being used to create a power 
differential between users and analysts (Van den Hoven, 1997) 
5) What organisational cultures have formed around the use of data within 
educational settings, and with what outcomes? – relating to emergent bias – 
the capacity of social uses of data systems to deflect from their stated 
purposes (Friedman & Nissenbaum, 1996) 
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6) How might data work be more efficiently and equitably arranged in 
educational contexts? – again relating to the varieties of informational 
injustice. (Selwyn, 2014, pp. 13-14) 
While ethical questions regarding the social uses of data have been extensively explored 
elsewhere, the analysis that follows is aimed at addressing the first and most fundamental of 
Selwyn’s questions, whether the data of human learning are fundamentally compatible and 
inter-operable with information as conceptualised, gathered and processed in learning 
analytic systems as currently designed.  
The Information-Theoretic Conception 
From its beginnings, information technology has engaged with philosophical questions in 
epistemology and ontology. Initially, the philosophy of information was largely concerned 
with the authentication of truth values in communication and machine manipulation of data. 
As such, it remained largely a sub-set of the philosophy of mathematics. Until recently, 
ethical discussions have been limited to the material effects of information technology, such 
as designing an air-traffic control system with failsafes to prevent planes falling out of the 
sky in the event of communication failure. Under such a description, ethical systems are 
synonymous with efficient systems, and the social effects of their design or use are regarded 
as ‘inherently value neutral’ (Alder, 1998). More recently, however, increasing concerns have 
been raised about ethical issues inherent in information systems and their use (Loch & 
Conger, 1996), (Wicker & Schrader, 2010), recognising that the way information systems 
collect and present information can have profound effects on a range of social interactions 
from our understandings of privacy (Schrader, Yan, Lundie, & Schulze, 2011) to our 
employment opportunities (Spencer, 1996). 
The information-theoretic account of knowledge, which has until recently been the dominant 
view in the philosophy of information and computing, attempts to address the problem of 
linking truth, knowledge and justification on the basis of information alone. Formally, this 
account states: 
K knows that s is F = K’s belief that s is F is caused (or causally sustained) by the 
information that s is F (Dretske, 1981) 
This approach seeks to solve Gettier-type problems of justification which undermine 
positivist epistemology (Gettier, 1963) by positing only causal chains. All justifications are 
simply further information about information. This account requires a definition of 
information such that information is meaningful, well-formed data (Floridi, 2004). Such an 
account is highly satisfactory when designing systems for information transfer and 
authentication, and consequently occupies a prominent place in information technology. To 
define such transfer and authentication as constitutive of human learning, however, is 
potentially penurious, not least because the definition of information on which it rests: ‘x is 
information that p if [and only if] p’ (Dretske, 1981) requires recourse to some other, 
referentially grounded, epistemic consideration if the information world is not to float free of 
any referent in the ‘real’ world. 
  The Givenness of the Human Learning Experience 
This mechanistic approach to knowledge is nothing new, in 1749, La Mettrie articulates an 
epstemology in many ways similar to the information-theoretic account of knowledge: 
‘sounds or words, which are transmitted from one person’s mouth, through 
another’s ear and into his brain’ (La Mettrie, 1996, p. 13). 
All sensory justifications, on this account, are information transmission. La Mettrie also 
prefigures another staple of the philosophy of information: the natural-language-use test for 
artificial intelligence. According to this test, a machine is intelligent if it is capable of using 
language in a way indistinguishable from an intelligent being by a native speaker (Turing, 
1949). La Mettrie predicts, quite presciently, the teaching of sign-language to apes, and from 
this surmises that there is nothing exceptional or non-mechanical about the human mind. 
Such an inference only holds true if one holds an information-theoretic account of 
intelligence – the ape, or the computer, is intelligent if and only if it plays the same role in the 
causal chain of information processing and transmission as a human subject.  
Contemporary attempts to situate machine learning in terms of symbol-grounding, enabling 
machines to associate information with referents in the world, still rely on this informational 
reduction of all data, and an equivalence between sense perception and information 
transmission, adding to it a further equivalence between subjective knowledge and sensory 
information. The symbol-grounding approach attempts to simulate in intelligent machinery a 
view of the brain which functions: 
by internalizing the process of creating m[eaningful]-representations. Rather 
than producing the representation in terms of external physical symbols 
(sounds, gestures…) an internal image is created and re-entered and processed 
as if it was perceived externally. (Steels, 2008) 
According to this view, the brain’s internal ‘imaging’ can be understood as representational, 
in the same way as external sensory data. As such, the brain can be understood as an 
information processor, receiving information from its internal processing (memories, 
imagination) in the same way as other information channels. I will argue that this model is 
insufficient for the development of human learning because the causal account on which it 
rests is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for the phenomenon of human subjectivity, 
an essential prerequisite for learning. 
In the absence of any non-informational justification, the information-theoretic conception of 
knowledge relies upon mathematical probability for epistemic certainty. The mathematical 
theory of communication proposes that information justifies knowledge in inverse proportion 
to probability (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). I have left my car door locked or unlocked, p=‘my 
car is unlocked’ has two possible states, so one piece of information can determine the truth 
value of p. If I know that one car in the car park has been left unlocked, however, many more 
items of information may be required to determine p’s truth value. Under this description, the 
more items of granular information can be gathered, the more certain an analytic system can 
be that learning outcomes have been met.  
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Furthermore, the General Definition of Information states that each item of information in 
this causal chain will be formed of meaningful, well-formed data (Floridi, 2004). This 
requires that the data can be understood, exchanged and interpreted in similar ways by more 
than one information processor. 
I contend that this account of knowledge, while highly satisfactory for the design of 
information systems, is entirely unsuited to the nature of education, because the epistemic 
value of learning is grounded in the learner as subject, not the data of learning content. As 
such, optimisation cannot be understood solely as a function of effective transmission of 
information through causal chains. Furthermore, the nature of human learning is grounded in 
a givenness which is irreducible to information transfer and incompatible with the general 
definition of information. Given that the success of information systems in use depends on 
the effective interaction between agents and mediating technologies (Ess, 2009), if the nature 
of one set of agents - the human learners - is fundamentally misunderstood in design, this can 
lead to bias in system use, with unforeseen social consequences (Friedman & Nissenbaum, 
1996). In the case of Learning Analytics, the unforeseen consequences can be seen in the 
elision of value and intent from learning, and a focus on information transfer which reduces 
and trivialises learner autonomy. Furthermore, by relying on granular metrics to test the 
human learner’s ability to complete a narrow set of tasks, involving the transfer and 
authentication of information (content knowledge and assessment), the stage is set for a form 
of education in which human learners are systemically subordinated to more efficient 
artificial information processors.   
The Learner as Intentional Subject 
Some advocates of informational accounts of knowledge have drawn upon Cartesian 
conceptions of the logical self as disembodied agent, separate from the world of objects about 
which information can be gathered, to ground an ontology of the human subject onto which 
information can be projected and processed (Bailey, 2005). This understanding of the 
knowing agent misrepresents or elides an essential element of the Cartesian project. As Jean-
Luc Marion (2003) has argued, the Cartesian ego is not solipsistic nor self-affirming but 
exists through ‘the originary interlocution of another who posits the ego in existence’ (p.49). 
In Meditatio II, Descartes posits: 
Nunquid est aliquis Deus, vel quocunque nomine illum vocem, qui mihi has 
ipsas cogitationes immitttit? [Is there not a God, or whatever he may be 
called, who gives me in myself the thoughts I am now having?] (Descartes, 
2008) 
From this, Marion infers the necessity of alterity to the Cartesian ego. Whether the ego is 
being persuaded or deceived, the structure of a dialogue posits a self. The ego’s self-
awareness on this account is not caused by a chain of information, which presupposes an 
information processor capable of giving meaning to the information. Instead, the ego 
encounters its ipseity, its selfhood, as given. This givenness enables the subject to know their 
existence but not to infer from this their essence. I may know that I am, but not know what it 
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is that I am (Marion, 2003). Givenness is not equivalent to the ‘ego cogito’, the thought 
thinking about itself – ‘[t]hinking about [the thought] is one mode of givenness; it is another 
one altogether to find oneself in the presence of – what gives itself.’ (Marion, 2002, p. 29). 
Marion’s reading alludes to the Augustinian origins of the Cartesian project. In the 
Augustinian anima, the interior sense is distinguished from the causal chains of information 
which reach the subject from the senses or through interpersonal communication,  
of all which sensible objects it is the images resembling them [data], but not 
themselves, that we perceive in the mind and hold in the memory… However, 
without any delusive representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain 
that I am, that I know, and that I delight in this… for if I am deceived, I am. 
For he who does not exist cannot be deceived… For, as I know that I am, so I 
know this also, that I know. And when I love these two [being and knowing], I 
add to them a third, that is, my love, which is of equal importance. 
(Augustine, City of God, XI, 26, 2007) 
This tripartite structure of knowledge, being and love, in which Augustinian pedagogy finds 
an interior image of God ‘for He who is said to reside in the interior man is Christ’ 
(Augustine, De Magistro XI, 38, 1938) finds its parallel in the role of imagination as 
constitutive of the intentional ego-subject in Descartes’ Meditatio II. 
The canonical reading of Descartes is bound up with a separation between mind and world, 
subject and object. It is for this reason that information philosopher Luciano Floridi considers 
the Augustinian position toward the world to be dualistic (Floridi, 2008) and considers it 
fundamentally ‘ontocentric’, respectful of the natural order of the universe, ‘a naturalistic 
philosophy that closely resonates with Spinoza, Plato, Confucius, and Buddhist thought 
(among others) in its affirmation of the intrinsic moral worth of the cosmos as such’ (p193). 
Marion’s highlighting of the fundamentally relational nature of the Cartesian ego, however, 
challenges such an account. In the second meditation, Descartes challenges the notion of 
personal identity as pertaining to the immaterial soul, responsible for such activity as ‘me 
nutriri, incedere, sentire, et cogitare’ [nourishment, motion, sense perception and thinking]. 
Descartes is not introducing here an immateriality to personal being. Rather, he presumes it 
already on the basis of Christian and classical arguments, but then goes further, to posit a 
grounding of the ego neither in body nor soul, but in a self-awareness which challenges, and 
imposes meaning upon, data concerning objects in the world.  
Marion (2003) highlights that Descartes is unable to infer essence from existence, yet having 
established that of all the attributes he ascribes to the soul, only thought establishes existence 
with certainty, Descartes immediately addresses to himself the question of essence: 
‘Quid praeterea? Imaginabor:’ [What else am I? I will use my imagination] 
(Descartes, 2008, p. 36) 
The purpose, then, of the ego, according to this reading is not a solipsistic refutation of the 
sceptics, but ‘Nihil nisi punctum petebat Archimedes, quod esset firmum et immobile, ut 
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integram terram loco dimoveret’ (Descartes, 2008); not to separate itself from the world of 
objects, but to move or order the world. The imagination does precisely this, not by 
separating subject from object, but by orienting subject-object-telos. The role of imagination 
in the Cartesian ego bears clear parallels to that of love in the Augustinian soul. 
Love/imagination as animating principle attach themselves to the certainty of thought, and 
from it, of being. It is not only that the ego is aware of an informational item, which in the 2nd 
Meditation assumes an immediacy, no longer cogito, ergo sum, but ego sum, ego existo 
(Marion, 2003, p. 41), but this awareness implies agency. Having not previously thought 
about or known the nature of his being, nor had the author imagined (Descartes, 2008, p. 35) 
but having come to know, he comes also to imagine. 
Only in considering the link between ego, cogito, imaginatio in the 2nd Meditation does a 
Cartesian pedagogy begin to suggest itself. In the analogy of the wax, Descartes sets up a 
fundamental element of human learning. While a causal chain of information is sufficient to 
knowing ‘ipso sensu externo’ the properties of the wax, it is only by ‘potentia imaginatrice’ 
[the power of imagination] that the author’s perception, while it may be erroneous, ‘non 
possum tamen sine humana mente percipere’ [at least requires a human mind] (Descartes, 
2008, p. 44). In drawing upon Augustine’s third principle of the certainty of self-knowledge – 
love, the human mind, the mind of an intentional subject, is required for imaginative learning 
because only then is a project, a telos, and therefore a meaning, attached to free-floating data 
about the world. Without meaning, data does not become information. 
The argument that an informational causal chain is sufficient to account for knowledge thus 
fails in an important aspect of human subjectivity. This is so because, contrary to Steels’ 
symbol-grounding conception of the brain, human subjects do not internalise the process of 
creating meaningful representations, (which is itself to beg the question of a further regress). 
Rather, the human subject is itself the locus of meaning.  
The human mind is required for human learning, not to process knowledge, but to imagine, 
that is, to direct affection toward the act of coming to know. ‘Beyond ‘collective 
representations of the person there is a unique particularized singularity… the particular 
isness of the self’ (Conroy, 2004, p. 6). This isness or intentionality, although enframed and 
situated in a network of cultural and technological interactions, nonetheless retains an 
irreducible interior complexity. It is not the alterity of the other which determines this inner 
realm, as though the data of self-knowledge were marked by meta-data which stated ‘inner 
voice’, while the data of interpersonal communication carry ‘someone else’s voice’ meta-
data. Rather, the recognition of incompleteness is a constitutive function of individual 
subjectivity (Conroy, 2009) and the subject is the locus and ground of meaning.  
In attempting to account for this grounding of meaning in the subject, Marion describes 
responsibility in terms of gaze or witness. This is not a causal claim, akin to the downloading 
of a photograph, because the responsible agent’s gaze necessarily entails affect. Augustine’s 
caritas, Descartes’ imaginatio and Marion’s responsibility posit the immediacy of an 
irreducible human valuing of the phenomenon of knowing. Information is not necessary for 
the phenomenon because there is nothing ‘behind’ the phenomenon from which to form a 
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causal chain, nor is information sufficient for the phenomenon, because data cannot account 
for this affective dimension to the gaze of the responsible subject. Marion posits three criteria 
for the givenness of the phenomenon which by definition render it incompatible with an 
informational account of knowledge: 
1) Intrinsic – givenness involves a bracketing out of the giver, there is no 
recourse to a cause 
2) Irrevocable – the given is not reproducible or repeatable [it is in-dividual] 
3) Radical – no gap exists between the givenness of a phenomenon and the 
phenomenon itself (Marion, 2002, pp. 175-176) 
The distinction here theorised is pre-ontological, making no claim about the materiality or 
otherwise of minds. Not only may it be grounded in divergent readings of Heideggerian 
phenomenology (Marion, 1998) (Zahavi, 1999) but equally in divergent accounts of the 
Cartesian cogito, of which Heidegger was so famously critical. In contrast to the 
informational abstraction ‘there is thought’, as Levinas argues, Descartes’ subject may be 
read as positing the intentional self as ‘a thing that thinks’ (Wyschogrod, 1990, p. 77). Far 
from merely ‘the carrier of rational knowledge’ (Bailey, 2005), the isness of this thinking 
thing has materiality and point of departure. Prior to executing any task the subject as cogito 
in its relationship to materiality, temporality, in short to ‘work’ enters into a space of 
immediacy in the sense of not being a producer of inter-operable, mediatable information. It 
is not by detaching subject from object in service of metaphysical certainty (Bailey, 2005) 
that the working subject gives meaning to the world, but through the orientation of subject-
object-end which constitutes meaningful work. This space is ‘the most primordial object of 
utility’ (Wyschogrod, 1990, p. 79) because by it a formative experience of the subject in 
contemplation of activity emerges, and it is from this intentional experience that any 
subsequent work proceeds. The thinking subject orders the world teleologically, with the 
thought itself among the objects of this ordering. 
In contrast, for informational work, the outcome is always inherent in the programming, such 
that nothing is gained by its execution (Spencer, 1996), technological production assumes the 
self as planner, substituting a planned and datafied universe for the universe of givenness 
(Marion, 2002). In learning which posits the learner as information processor, information 
passes through the subject, leaving the subject unchanged. Metrics predicated on call-
response protocols encourage, or at least do not discourage, this form of work, the 
authentication-without-remainder of ‘correct’ informational transactions. It is not that the 
information present to the senses, mediated through a causal account of knowledge, is 
delusory as Descartes contended of the camera obscura (Descartes, 1954), but rather that 
information itself does not fulfil the causal relation between learning and acting in the human 
subject, which requires an act of intentionality. 
Reducing givenness to the mathematical theory of communication, in which the quantity of 
information sufficient for knowledge is inversely proportional to probability, results in a 
paradox. On the canonical reading of Descartes, only the ego cogito, the thought, is required 
to establish self-knowledge. Given the phenomenon of thought, this single item of 
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information is sufficient to verify p=‘I exist’. However, as the ego, the responsible subject, is 
itself the ground of meaning, and that meaning is given intrinsically, this datum is not 
meaningful or well-formed according to the general definition of information. Consequently, 
this datum is not informational, and it follows that no information is required to verify p. This 
paradox is resolved with recourse to the intentional reading of Meditatio II: the givenness of 
the phenomenon is immediate, ego cogito, ego existo, so there is only one possible state of 
affairs, and no information is required to verify it. The quantity Q of information required to 
assert p: the existence of the subject is at once Q=1 and Q=0, because given the phenomenon, 
the subject must exist. Because the subject remains always insufficient to its own 
informational truth-value, the subject is always incapable of fully appropriating itself, 
remaining ‘strange from within’ (Conroy, 2009, p. 147). The human call-response includes an 
intersubjectivity not found in computer information transfer protocols, the subject as gift is 
always other, the ego cannot ‘authenticate itself without remainder’ (Marion, 2002, p. 290). 
It is not, then, that self-knowledge and intentionality are immaterial, in the sense of the 
canonical dualist reading of Descartes, but rather that they are non-informational, being 
neither compatible with the general definition, nor with a causal chain of knowledge. In 
contradistinction to the causal chain of authentication proposed by the information-theoretic 
account of knowledge, Marion draws attention to ‘responsibility’ as characteristic of the 
human call-response. Responsibility is not caused but given, a function of: 
‘Mineness’ – the characteristic according to which I am at issue, in person and 
without any possible substitution - … a claim imposes a choice on me; or 
better; that a claim poses me as the there where one might recognise oneself… 
In short, the claim does not destroy the irreducible identity-with-self by 
dismissing any I in me, but inversely, underscores and provokes it. (Marion, 
1998, p. 201) 
Inverting the symbol-grounding approach to interiority as the internalisation of symbols, the 
intentional or responsible subject requires that processes of symbolic self-representation or 
authorisation are to some extent metaphorical, any symbol being an imaginary representation 
of the irreducible self for the purposes of interaction. A causal chain of information is 
insufficient to account for the self-knowledge of the responsible subject, but it is also, 
importantly, unnecessary, because responsibility on this account consists in a response not 
reducible to authentication, and therefore to information. 
In place of La Mettrie’s Machine Man, the account of the human subject set out above: given 
not caused; responsible not authenticated; intentional not informational, is irreducible to an 
information-theoretic conception of knowledge. Human subjectivity is not reducible to 
repeatable, communicable or causally sustained data. Therefore the data of human 
subjectivity cannot be regarded as meaningful or well-formed according to the general 
definition of information. Human learners as intentional subjects value their experience of 
learning incommensurably with information simpliciter. In designing human-computer 
interaction for learning, this metaphorical leap between the irreducible intentional subject and 
the socio-technically constructed identity of the user must be borne in mind. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Without the need to posit an immaterial ego-soul, as the canonical reading of Descartes 
would suggest, it is nonetheless possible to argue for something constitutive of human 
subjectivity which is both distinct from call-response chains of information and which 
manifests that distinction in materially significant ways, not merely as a reflective soul, but as 
a being acting in and giving meaning to the social and educational world. The intentional 
subject is the learner as lover of learning, imaginator and witness. Human subjects are 
distinguished from robots, databases and Turing machines, not by their response to any given 
problem set (Floridi, 2005) but because they value their own information incommensurably 
with information in the abstract, viewing it not as exchange value but as gift. My mother’s 
maiden name has an exchange value as a password for my credit cards, but it has another 
value, linked to memory, heritage and family. This latter value is intentional, it is mine not 
because ownership of it was transferred to me in a causal chain, rather its having value for me 
is inseparable from and coterminous with its being mine.  
Learning analytics enables the collection, aggregation and multivariate analysis of large 
quantities of metadata, information about information transactions, detailed data about how 
people come to know. This shifts the emphasis of pedagogical research from the interaction 
of learning subjects to the means by which those interactions are mediated. Metadata is 
information according to the information-theoretic definition, it is meaningful when used to 
calculate the probability of a given state of affairs – how likely is it, given the number of 
words John reads in 60 seconds, that he will be capable of success in English Literature at AS 
Level. It is not information about the learner as subject – it is unconcerned with consciously 
willed dispositions or the intentions of the learner. Individuals generate metadata without 
having any conscious sense of doing so – keystroke patterns, eye tracker movements, even 
brain states – this data can be aggregated to produce a complex and granular picture with 
remarkable predictive capacity, yet it entirely ignores conscious human subjectivity. As I 
hope to have demonstrated, the definitions of knowledge, learning and intelligence derived 
from the philosophy of computing, as commonly used in definitions of ‘machine learning’ or 
‘artificial intelligence’, are at best metaphors for simulations of human-like processes. As 
metaphors, such terms are highly satisfactory in the design of systems. Design aimed at 
optimizing human learning, however, requires first a recognition that these definitions are 
insufficient, and secondly an engagement with philosophical pedagogy and the human 
sciences. Failure to do so can result in a reductive call-response measure of optimal learning 
as the merest transmission of information. This reductive informationalism represents a clear 
and present threat to contemporary education. 
The responsible human subject must respond ‘for the event as its witness… to the affection 
that his flesh undergoes in and through itself… for the scope of his own gaze’ (Marion, 2002, 
p. 293) and not merely to the call in a reductive call-response informational chain. This 
response for learning, and not merely to content characterises intentionality, without which 
learning cannot be witting and willing, or authentically human. 
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Responding to the question of inter-operability and compatibility, the phenomenon of the 
human learning subject is not reducible to informational transactions. This conclusion need 
not be penurious for learning analytics, provided that the metaphorical character of ‘learning’ 
as measured by digital data is acknowledged in the design and use of systems. Attentive to 
the intentional and intersubjective character of human learning, data analytics can serve to 
optimise environments in which the imaginative and affective encounter is possible. The 
error of conflating such measures with the telos of human education must be avoided if 
education is not to be reduced to a series of fine-grained informational transactions. As 
measurement becomes ubiquitous in the social and educational world and machines gain 
exponentially in informational intelligence, it is essential that educators turn their attention 
toward making human learners more imaginative, responsible, cultivating attitudes of 
openness, gratitude and love toward knowledge. In so doing, it may indeed be possible to 
optimise the environment for that unique intentionality which characterises the education of 
persons. 
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